We study notions and schemes for symmetric (ie. private key) encryption in a concrete security framework.
Introduction
An encryption scheme enables Alice to send a message to Bob in such a way that an adversary Eve does not gain significant information about the message content. This is the classical problem of cryptography. It is usually considered in one of two settings. In the symmetric (privatekey) one, encryption and decryption are performed under a key shared by the sender and receiver. In the asymmetric (public-key) setting the sender has some public information and the receiver holds some corresponding secret information.
In this paper we have two goals. The first is to study notions of symmetric encryption in the framework of concrete security. This means we will look at the concrete complexity of reductions between different notions. We want to prove both upper and lower bounds. In this way we can establish tight relations between the notions and can compare notions (even though polynomially reducible to each other)
Background and Motivation
The pioneering work of Goldwasser and Micali [ 111 was the first to introduce formal notions of sqcurity for encryption. Specifically, they presented two notions of security for asymmetric encryption, "semantic security" and "polynomial security," and proved them equivalent with respect to polynomial-time reductions. Micali, Rackoff and Sloan [ 171 showed that (appropriate versions of) these notions were also equivalent to another notion, suggested by Yao [20] . A uniform complexity treatment of notions of asymmetric encryption is given by Goldreich [SI. Some adaptations of these notions to the symmetric setting are presented by Luby in [ 15, .
Goldwasser and Micali [ 1 11 also specified an asymmetric encryption scheme whose security (in the senses above) is polynomial-time reducible from quadratic residuosity. Subsequently many other schemes have emerged, based on various hard problems.
CONCRETE SECURITY. The viewpoint in all the works above is that two notions of security are equivalent if there is a polynomial-time reduction between them; and a scheme is declared provably secure if there is some polynomial-time reduction from a hard problem to it. These are certainly basic questions, but we believe that, once the answers are known, it is important to classify notions and schemes in a more precise way.
To make an analogy, caring only about polynomialtime reducibility in cryptography is a bit like caring only whether a computational problem is or is not in P. Yet we know there are a lot of interesting questions (including most of the field of algorithms, and much of complexity theory) centered around getting further information about problems already known to be in P. Such information helps to better understand the problem and is also essential for practical applications.
Paying attention to the concrete complexity of polynomially-equivalent notions in cryptography has similar payoffs. In particular, when reductions are not security-preserving it means that one must use a larger security parameter to be safe, reducing efficiency. Thus, in the end, one pays for inefficient reductions in either assurance or running time.
Our approach for doing concrete security is that of [5, 6] , wherein one parameterizes the resources involved and measures adversarial success by an explicit function on them.
The approach is non-asymptotic and applicable to functions with a finite domain. We will be concerned not only with proving security by exhibiting concrete bounds, but also with showing that these bounds are the best possible, which is done by exhibiting matching attacks. Again we follow works like [3, 51, who did this for certain message authentication schemes.
Though this paper is concerned with concrete security for symmetric encryption we believe that, in general, concrete security is one of the major emerging avenues for productive research in theoretical cryptography.
Notions of Security
We will consider four notions of security for symmetric encryption and examine the complexity of reductions between them. The first notion, which we call "real-orrandom indistinguishability" is new, and the second, "leftor-right indistinguishability" is a variant of it. The next two notions, "find-then-guess security" and "semantic security" are adaptations of the notions of [l 11 to the symmetric setting.' Our goal, in all the notions, is to model chosen-plaintext attacks.
As indicated above, our approach to concrete security is via parameterization of the resources of the adversary A.
We distinguish between A's running time, t (by convention, we include in this the space for A s program); the amount of ciphertext A sees, p; and the number of queries, q, made by A to an encryption oracle. (To model a chosen-plaintext attack we must give the adversary the ability to see ciphertexts. In the public key setting she can create them herself given the public key, but in the symmetric key setting the encryption key is secret so we must modify the model and provide the adversary with an oracle for the encryption function. The presence of the encryption oracle is one reason it would be untrue to regard the notion of symmetric encryption as a special case of asymmetric encryption.) With an eye towards practical applications, it is ically, obtaining legitimate ciphertexts is more problematic than performing local computation.) We thus get a notion of (t, q, p; €)-security, meaning the success probability of an adversary is at most E when its resources are as indicated. Of course how the success probability is measured varies across the four different notions.
Reductions Among the Notions
We show that real-or-random indistinguishability and leftor-right indistinguishability are equivalent, up to a small constant factor in the reduction. (That is, we have securitypreserving reductions between them.) We also show a security-preserving reduction from these notions to findthen-guess security. However, the reduction from findthen-guess security to left-or-right (or real-or-random) indistinguishability is not security-preserving. However, we show that the reduction we give is tight; one cannot hope to do better. We show a security-preserving reduction from semantic security to find-then-guess. In the other direction the complexity of our reduction depends on the time complexity of the "information function," f (representing the property of the plaintext semantic security is talking about) and "message-space sampling algorithm." The reduction is good if these complexities are low.
From the above results it is clear that when one wants to prove the security of some encryption scheme II it is best to give a tight reduction from real-or-random indistinguishability or left-or-right indistinguishability, since that implies good reductions to the rest. A summary of the reductions is given in Figure 1 . Although concrete security has been considered before in the context of scheme analysis this is the first work that considers it also for the purpose of relating different notions of security. That is, this is the first time notions are classified as weaker or stronger according to the complexity of the reductions between them.
Actually these results extend easily to the asymmetric setting. We focus on the symmetric mainly because that's the domain in which lie the schemes we want to analyze.
Security of Encryption Schemes
We analyze the security of some classic symmetric encryption schemes. Specifically, we look at two different modes of encryption with a block cipher (eg., DES): CBC (Cipher Block Chaining mode); and XOR (sometimes called counter mode). For the latter we look at both a probabilistic and a stateful version.
In these schemes the underlying primitive is a pseudorandom function (PRF) or pseudorandom permutation (PRP) family F in which a particular function Fa, specified by a key a, maps I-bits to L-bits for fixed I , L. (For permutations, I = L.) To encrypt a message the applications of Fa are iterated in some scheme-dependent way. We wish to see how the security of the encryption scheme depends on the assumed security of the PRF family. We define the concrete security of PRF and PRP families as in [6] 
More history
We have already mentioned the most important related work, namely [ 111. Here we provide some more detailed comparisons and histories and also discuss other work.
Since our results imply that the notions we consider are equivalent under polynomial time reductions, they can be viewed, at one level, as providing the analogue of [ 111 for the symmetric case.
In treating the asymmetric setting, [8] says that the symmetric case can be dealt with similarly. One ingredient missing in this view is that to model chosen-plaintext attack one must, in the symmetric setting, supply the adversary with some means to encrypt. We extend polynomial and semantic security by providing the adversary with an encryption oracle.
Stronger notions of asymmetric encryption than those of [ 1 1, 171 have also appeared, including [ 19, 7] , but our concern here is restricted to preserving privacy under chosenplaintext attack.
Luby [ 151 defines what is essentially find-then-guess security for symmetric encryption, and he mentions encryption using a pseudorandom function family whose output length is the number of bits you wish to encrypt. His treatment pays some attention to the efficiency of reductions (though he does not concern himself with concrete security to the same extent that we do).
Curiously, some early works had a more concrete treatment: in the asymmetric encryption arena, Alexi et. al. [ 13 were careful to specify the complexity of their reductions, a habit many later works unfortunately dropped.
The construction of a pseudorandom generator from a one-way function [ 131 provides a solution for symmetric encryption starting from a one-way function. In the current work existence is not the issue; we are interested in concrete security and the analysis of some particular schemes.
A concrete security analysis of the CBC MAC is provided in [6] . (The CBC MAC should not be confused with CBC encryption: The former is a message authentication code.) We build on their techniques, but those techniques don' t directly solve the problems here. CBC mode encryption is standardized in [2, 14, 181.
This abstract
This is an extended abstract that contains only definitions, scheme descriptions and result statements. Proofs have been omitted due to page limits. A full version of our paper, containing all proofs, can be found as [4] .
Notions of Encryption
For all complexity measures fix some probabilistic RAM model. We adopt the convention that "time" refers to the actual running time plus the size of the code (relative to some fixed programming language). Oracle queries are answered in unit time.
If A(., . 7 . . .) is any probabilistic algorithm then a t A ( q , z2, . . .) denotes the experiment of running A on inputs q , 2 2 . . . and letting a be the outcome, the probability being over the coins of A. Similarly, if A is a set then a t A denotes the experiment of selecting a point uniformly from A and assigning a this value.
Syntax of Encryption Schemes
Let Coins be a synonym for {0,1}" (the set of infinite strings). Let MsgSp C {0,1}* be a set, the message space, or else the induced probability space. Similarly, we often omit mention of the final argument to E , thinking of €, as a probabilistic algorithm, or thinking of E,(z) as the induced probability space. We intend D,(y) = I to be used in the case that y is not the encryption of any string z under key a.
For an encryption scheme to be useful, E, 27, and K should be efficiently computable functions, but the notion of security makes no formal demands in this regard. STATEFUL ENCRYPTION. We also consider stateful encryption schemes, in which the ciphertext is a function of some information, such as a counter, maintained by the encrypting party and updated with each encryption. Formally such a scheme has the same syntax as before except that
were St g {0,1}* is the set of possible states, containing a distinguished state, the empty string, E , which we call the initial state. Let Ei (i = 1,2) denote the i-th component of E . The ciphertext is now (the output of) E2, while €' is an updated state, stored by the sender, and used as the third argument for the next application of the encryption function. Note that encryption becomes stateful but decryption does not.
Four Notions of Security
We now give four notions for security, each modeling chosen-plaintext attack. In each case, we allow the adversary access to an encryption oracle in some form; this is one feature distinguishing these definitions from previous ones. We will describe our definitions for stateless encryption schemes and later indicate how to modify them for stateful ones.
REAL-OR-RANDOM. The idea is that an adversary cannot distinguish the encryption of text from the encryption of an equal-length string of garbage. (By transitivity, the adversary cannot distinguish from each other the encryption of any two equal-length strings.) The formalization considers two different games. In Game 1 we start by choosing a random key a t K. Then the adversary is then given an oracle which, when asked a string x E MsgSp, responds with a (random) encryption of x under key a. In Game 2 we start by choosing a random key a t K. Then the adversary is given an oracle which, when asked a string x E MsgSp, responds with a (random) encryption (under key a) of a random string of length 1x1. The encryption scheme is "good" if no "reasonable" adversary cannot obtain "significant" advantage in distinguishing Games 1 and 2.
is 5 e, for any adversary A which runs in time at most t, makes at most q oracle queries, these totaling at most p bits.
The notation AEa(.) indicates A with an oracle which, in response to a query 2, returns y t E,(s). (Meaning it picks a random string T and returns Ea(z, r ) . A new random string is chosen for each invocation of the oracle.) The notation AEa (e"') indicates A with an oracle which, in response to a query x, chooses z ' t (0, 1}121 and then returns y t €, (z').
LEFT-OR-RIGHT. We again consider two different games.
In either game a query is a pair (x1,zz) of equal-length strings from MsgSp. In either game we start by choosing a random key a t K: and fixing this key for the duration of the game, In Game 1, an oracle receiving (zl,x2) responds with with a random sample from €,(XI). In Game 2 it responds with a random sample from Ea(x2). Thus, Game 1 provides a "left" oracle and Game 2 provides a "right" oracle. We consider an encryption scheme to be "good" if "reasonable" adversary cannot obtain "significant" advantage in distinguishing Games 1 and 2.
Definition 2 [Left-or-Right] Encryption scheme 11 = (E, D, K) is said to be (t, q, p; €)-secure, in the left-or-right sense, if for any adversary A which runs in time at most t and asks at mostueries, these totaling at most p bits,2 Our adversary will run in two stages. During the adversary's select stage it endeavors to come up with an advantageous distribution M,. In the adversary's predict stage it is given a random ciphertext y for a pkihtext 3: chosen according to the distribution M, and it wants to guess f (x). An encryption scheme is semantically secure for function f and distributions M if no reasonable adversary A can guess f(z) with probability significantly better Previous formalizations reauired the condition to hold
The notation A indicates A with an oracle which, in response to query (x1, xz), returns y t Ea(xl). The notation AEa(right(.,.)) indicates A with an oracle which, in response to query ( 2 1 , xz), returns y t E, (~2 ) .
FIND-THEN-GUESS. This is an adaptation of the notion of polynomial security as given in [ l l , 171 . We imagine an than p;,M,.
adversary A that runs in two stages. During the adversary's find stage she endeavors to come up with a pair of equallength messages, xo and xl, whose encryptions she wants to try to tell apart. She also retains some state information s that she may want to preserve to help her later. In the adversary's guess stage she is given a random ciphertext y for one of the plaintexts ZO, 2 1 , together with the state information s. The adversary "wins" if she correctly identifies which plaintext goes with y. The encryption scheme is "good" if "reasonable" adversaries can' t win significantly more than half the time.
Definition 3 [Find-then-Guess]
Encryption scheme Definitions of security for stateful encryption schemes are obtained by modifying the above definitions in the natural way, adjusting how one answers oracle queries. Notice that the encryption oracles now have "memory": between invocations, the state is modified and retained. The notation A".($' '1 can be similarly re-interpreted, and the same approach applies to the other three definitions.
ASYMPTOTIC DEFINITIONS. Our definitions are easily extended to the standard asymptotic framework by simply saying that a scheme is secure, in a given sense, if the advantage of any polynomial time adversary is negligible, as a function of an underlying security parameter on which the scheme now depends. The above formulations just enable us to make more concrete statements.
Reductions Among the Notions
Here we look at the reductions among the different notions of security. We look at both upper bounds and lower bounds. The proofs of these results are in [4] .
Because we are paying attention to concrete security bounds, we can use our results to decide how strong is a notion of security relative to other notions to which it is polynomially equivalent. This information is useful because it helps us identify the most desirable starting points for reductions. We implicitly use this information in Section 4 when we demonstrate the security of schemes via reductions from left-or-right indistinguishability.
In the theorems below, c is an absolute constant that depends only on details of the underlying model of computation. The first two theorems say that our first two notions, left-or-right indistinguishability and real-or-random indistinguishability, are of essentially equivalent strength. is (tl, 41, p1; ~l)-secure in the real-or-random sense then it is ( t 2 , q2, pa; ~2)-secure in the left-or-right sense, where t2 = t l -c . p2 and q2 = q1 and p2 = p1 and €2 = 2~1 .
Theorem 2 [Left-or-right implies real-or-random] For some constant c > 0, if encryption scheme II = (E, D, IC)
is (t2,q2, p2; ~2)-secure in the left-or-right sense then it is ( t l , q1 p1; El)-secure in the real-or-random sense, where tl = t 2 -c . p1 andq, = q2 andp, = p2 and €1 = €2.
Left-or-right indistinguishability and real-or-random indistinguishability constitute a stronger notion of security than the traditional find-then-guess notion. Intuitively, the adversary's job is harder with find-then-guess because it has to single out a single message pair on which to perform. This is illustrated by Theorems 3 and 4 and Proposition 5.
The first theorem says that a scheme with a certain security in the left-or-right sense has essentially the same security in the find-then-guess sense.
Theorem 3 [Left-or-right implies find-then-guess] For
some constant c > 0, if encryption scheme II = ( E , V l IC)
is ( t 2 , q2,p2; ~2)-secure in left-or-right sense then i t is (t3, q3,p3; secure in the find-then-guess sense, where t 3 = t 2 -c . p 3 andq3 = 92 andp3 = p 2 a n d~3 = E Z . The next theorem says that if a scheme has a certain security in the find-then-guess sense, then it is secure in the left-or-right sense, but the security shown is quantitatively lower. is (t3, q3,p3; ~3)-secure in the find-then-guess sense then it is ( t 2 , q2,p2; ~2)-secure in the left-or-right sense, where t 2 = t3 -c . p 2 andq2 = 43 andp2 = p3 and^ = q2E3.
Theorem 4 [Find-then-guess implies left-or-right]
The following proposition says that the drop in security above is not due to any weakness in the reduction but is intrinsic-we present a scheme having a higher security in the find-then-guess sense than in the left-or-right sense, with the gap being the same as in the theorem above. Obviously we can make no such statement if there are no secure encryption schemes around at all, so the theorem assumes there exists a secure scheme, and then constructs a different scheme exhibiting the desired gap. In the following think of E' as very small (essentially zero). The constructed scheme II' can be broken with probability e2 = 0.632, usingueries, in the left-or-right sense, meaning it is completely insecure under this notion. However, the probability of breaking it (with comparable resources) in the find-then-guess sense is €3 M l / q . The probabilities obey the relation 4.53 = O ( E~) , showing that Theorem 4 is essentially tight. Furthermore, if one allows the scheme to be stateful, one can make €2 exactly one, so that q~3 z €2.
Proposition 5 [Left-or-right is stronger than find-thenguess]
There is a constant c > 0 such that the following is true. Suppose there exists a stateless encryption scheme, overamessage space containing(0, l}, thatis (t', q, p; E')-secure in the find-then-guess sense. Then there exists a stateless encryption scheme II' which is ( t 2 , q, q; €2)-breakable in the left-or-right sense and (t3 q, p; ~s)-secure in the find-then-guess sense, where €2 = 0.632 and €3 = ~' + l / q andtz = cq and t3 = t'. Furthermore there exists a stateful encryption scheme II" which bas the same features except that €2 = 1.
Semantic security is too complex to make it a good starting point for proving schemes secure. Still, as the next theorem indicates, it is nice that there is a strong reduction from semantic security to find-then-guess security. Notice that for this only requires semantic security to hold for a particular and simple function, the identity function, and a particular and simple distribution over the message space. This theorem is implicit in [ 1 I] for the asymmetric setting and their proof is easily adapted to the symmetric setting. Combining this with Theorem 4 yields a reduction from security in the semantic sense to security in the left-or-right sense, but this reduction inherits the security loss of the reduction of Theorem 4. As before it turns out this loss is inherent: security in the left-or-right sense is a stronger notion. The example to see this is essentially the same as that in the proof of Proposition 5 but the setup becomes more complicated. We do not discuss it further here.
In Notice that the larger the functions TM ( e ) , T f ( e ) , the less the semantic security for f over A4 as given by Theorem 7.
Does this reflect a reality? That is, would we expect the adversary might have an easier time figuring out some complex property of the plaintext than figuring out simple properties of the plaintext? Perhaps. In any case, these theorems are most useful when the information function f is simple, like the XOR of all the bits.
In earlier work [ 11, 17, 81 no restriction was made on the complexity of f ; it was even allowed to be uncomputable. Clearly semantic security against such very complex functions does not follow from Theorem 7. However it is seems possible to do a different reduction by using the techniques of [8] . Here, the complexity of f would not enter (though the complexity of sampling M , would still matter). The dependencies on other parameters would be increased. Thus the theorem would be useful in talking about complex functions f , but less useful than Theorem 7 in talking about simple functions. We do not pursue this more at the moment because, as we have indicated above, other notions of security are more suitable targets than semantic security as targets for actual schemes to meet.
Putting things together, showing an encryption scheme left-or-right secure or real-or-random secure implies tight reductions to all other notions (modulo the technical restriction on the complexity of f and M for semantic security). Showing an encryption scheme find-then-guess secure or semantically secure does not. Thus, if the bounds are equal, it is better to demonstrate security with respect to one of the first two notions, since that immediately translates into equally-good bounds for the other notions.
Analysis of Some Schemes
Next we turn to analyzing schemes for symmetric encryption. All these schemes are based on finite pseudorandom functions, a concrete security version of the original notion of pseudorandom functions [ 101 introduced by [6] . We thus begin with some necessary definitions, following the latter paper. Proofs of results given in this section are in [4] .
Finite PRFs and PWs
Afunction family is a multiset F of functions where all of the functions in F have the same domain and range. Usually the domain is {O,l}l and the range is (0, l}L for some I , L called, respectively, the input length and the output length. We assume that each key a from some set K specifies a function Fa: {0,1}' -+ (0, l}L from F. Usually K is the set of all strings of some fixed length k. We write f c F to denote the operation of selecting a function at random from F according to the distribution given by picking a random a t K and assigning f = F,.
For a function family F to be accessible to applications we usually want that, given a, one can easily compute Fa.
But we make nor formal requirements in this regard, and indeed it is useful to think about "inaccessible" function families, as below.
We let R~, L be the function family consisting of all functions from the set of 1-bit strings to the set of L-bit strings. (The key a can be viewed as the entire description of the function.) With I , L understood, we write R instead of R~, L .
Thus f t R is the operation of selecting a random function from I-bits to L-bits. Similarly, we let PI be the function family consisting of all permutations on 1-bit strings. With 1 understood we write P instead of 9.
Let F, G be families of functions with the same input and output lengths. consider an oracle algorithm, known as a distinguisher, that attempts to distinguish between the case where its oracle h is chosen randomly from F and the case where h is chosen randomly from G. Let DistD(F, G) =
A pseudorandom function family has the property that the input-output behavior of F, "looks random" to someone who does not know the randomly selected key a. There are two notions of "looking random" that are important. The first is looking like a random function, the second is looking like a random permutation. Accordingly, we define 
The XOR Schemes
Fix a function family F with input length 1, output length L, and key length IC. We let a denote the key shared between the two parties who run the encryption scheme. It will be used to specify the function f = Fa. In fact, all the schemes depend only only on this function, in the sense that they can be implemented given an oracle for the function. We let R = RI+..
There are two version of the XOR scheme-one stateless (randomized) and the other stateful (counter based and deterministic). 
SPECIFICATIONS. The scheme XOR$(F)
(1) ?-+-{0,1)'
(1) Parse z as T 11 y1 + . -y n (2) fori = 1 , . . . , n do z, = f ( r + i)$yi The XOR schemes have some computational advantages over the more common modes of operation. Namely, the Fa computations on different blocks can be done in parallel since the computation on a block is independent of the other blocks. This parallelizability advantage can be realized through either hardware or software support. Decryption does not have to be done in order if each block is tagged with its index. These schemes also support off-line processing, in the sense that the Fa computations can be done during idle times before the messages they are to be used with become available. SECURITY OF XOR$. We first derive a lower bound on the success of an adversary trying to break the XOR$(F) scheme in the left-or-right sense. In the common cryptographic terminology, this means, simply, that we are providing an attack. The attack we specify is on the "ideal" scheme, namely the one where the underlying function f is truly random. This is a "birthday" attack. It may be easier to gauge if we let fi = p / ( L q ) be the average number of blocks per query, so that p = Lg -ii. Then we see that Ad"; = fI(q2/2') 6, a typical birthday behavior exhibiting a quadratic dependence on the number of queries.
Since we prove a lower bound in the random function model, we do not discuss the time used by E. However it is clear from the strategy that the total time used by E would be just a little overhead besides the time for the oracle calls. This is true for all lower bounds and we won't mention it again. Proposition 9 indicates that even when the underlying block cipher F is very good (it can't get better than truly random) the XOR scheme leaks some information as more and more data is encrypted. Next, we show that the above is essentially the best attack: one can't get a better advantage, up to a constant factor. The crucial point below is that the bound holds for any adversary. 
Of course, an indication of security in the ideal model is not an indication of security when we use a block cipher. The "real-world" case however is easily derived from the above: 
The CBC Scheme
For the CBC scheme we require that I = L (the input and output lengths of F are the same) and that each F, be a permutation such that given a we can compute not only Fa but also FL1. As far as security goes, however, we still view F a pseudorandom function family. Having stated the results for this case we will discuss what happens when F is a PRP family.
SPECIFICATION. The scheme CBC$(F)
= (E-CBC$, 2)-CBC$, IC-CBC$) has the same key generation algorithm as the previous schemes, meaning the key for encryption is the key a specifying f = Fa. The message x to be encrypted is regarded as a sequence of 1 bit blocks, x = x~ . . . xn. The "real-world" security follows: CBC WITH COUNTERS. It is tempting to make a counter variant of CBC and hope that the security is increased (or at least preserved). Indeed it is suggested in various books that the initialization vector may be a counter. But this does not work; knowing the next value of the counter, the adversary can choose a message query that forces a collision in the inputs to f, thus breaking the scheme (under any of the definitions).
To make a proper counter version of CBC$, one can let the initialization vector be yo = f (ctr) and increment ctr by one following every encryption. The scheme is capable of encrypting at most 2l messages. An analog to Theorem 16 is then possible. The result is easiest (following as a corollary to Theorem 16) if the key used to determine yo is separate from the key used for the rest of the CBC encryption.
